Energy performance contracting (EPC): a suitable mechanism for achieving energy savings in housing cooperatives? Results from a Norwegian pilot project by unknown
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Energy performance contracting (EPC): a suitable mechanism
for achieving energy savings in housing cooperatives? Results
from a Norwegian pilot project
Tanja Winther & Kjell Gurigard
Received: 19 January 2016 /Accepted: 29 August 2016
# The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract The barriers to energy savings in institutions
and private homes are well known and include people’s
lack of interest, awareness, knowledge and human and
financial capacity. Experiences made in several countries
show that EPC—energy performance contracting—may
be used for overcomingmany of these barriers. A typical
EPC project is delivered by an energy service company
(ESCO) and the contract is accompanied with a guaran-
tee for energy savings. EPC is increasingly taken in use
in the professional market (firms and the public sector),
but is less common in the residential sector market. It has
been suggested that there are several barriers for using
EPC in the domestic sector such as the uncertainty
involved in estimating forthcoming reductions in private
consumption. In this paper, we present the results from a
pilot project on the use of EPC in a housing cooperative
in Oslo. The project was initiated and observed by the
researchers. The research followed a transdisciplinary
methodology in that it was conducted by both researcher
and practitioner (co-authors) in close collaboration with
members of the housing cooperative and the ESCOs,
who also contributed to the interpretation of results. We
document the process in terms of why the Board decided
to join the EPC pilot, the call for offers from ESCOs who
guaranteed that purchased annual energy would be
reduced by one third, the responses to and negotiations
of the offer from the ESCO who became contracted in
the initial phase and up to the moment when the General
Assembly finally decided to not invest in the proposed
energy saving measures. We find that the residents not
only had limited interest in energy savings but also
lacked confidence in the EPC process. This contributed
to the outcome. We discuss the findings in relation to the
barriers to using EPC among housing cooperatives. We
highlight the need for more knowledge about the client
side for understanding how barriers may be overcome.
Three specific recommendations for how EPC may suc-
cessfully be employed among housing cooperatives are
suggested as follows: (i) include refurbishment and not
only energy savings in the EPC, (ii) identify the resi-
dents’ needs in an early phase and (iii) communicate the
EPC principle to the residents throughout the process.
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Introduction
Performance contracting is said to have its roots in
France in 1937 when a heating system in a hospital in
Villiers-Saint-Denis suddenly broke down (Andersson
et al. 2011:17). When the heating was restored, the
hospital manager requested a contract for supply and
operation of energy services that ensured a steady indoor








soon exported the concept to the UK and the USAwhere
contracts for shared benefits between contractor and
customer were further developed (ibid.).
It would take another 50–60 years before energy
performance contracting (EPC) became common in the
form we know today: a market mechanism in which an
energy service company (ESCO) provides a customer
with a financially binding guarantee of the energy sav-
ings that will be achieved. According to the World
Energy Outlook, 80 % of the economic potential of
energy efficiency in buildings is still untapped (WEO
2012). Some of the barriers to energy savings are con-
sidered to be people’s lack of awareness, knowledge and
interest in prioritising energy efficiencymeasures, a lack
of confidence in the profitability of energy efficiency
measures and a lack of financial capacity to initiate such
measures. Proponents of the model regard EPC as a
particularly suitable tool for overcoming such barriers
to cost-efficient energy savings.
Towards 2000 and in the following years, the
USA experienced a rapid growth in the EPC market
due to new policies, EPC standards, prequalified
ESCOs, evidence of success in previous projects as
well as new funding sources (Hoyle 2013). Also in
European and Asian countries, the EPC market has
been growing although at a slower rate and with
great variation between countries (Bertoldi et al.
2006; Bleyl et al. 2013; Zhang et al. 2015; Nolden
and Sorrell 2016; Labanca et al. 2015). Reflecting
the increasing faith in EPC in the European Union,
member states have since 2003 been required to
implement performance-based energy regulations
(European Commission, 2003 MB, found in
Guerra-Santin and Itard 2012), and a Code of Con-
duct was launched in 2015.1 In Norway, the EPC
market has been denoted as ‘preliminary’ (Bertoldi
et al. 2014:253) and ‘intermediary’ (EU/IEE
2013:8), but recently, more than 50 Norwegian mu-
nicipalities have committed themselves to EPC pro-
jects. On average, these projects have the goal of
saving approximately 30 % of overall energy use
(Aasen et al. 2016). The introduction of a national
EPC standard (NS6430-2014) is expected to facili-
tate further growth in this market.
In this paper, we present and discuss the results from
an innovative Norwegian pilot project2 in which EPC
was tested out in a housing cooperative3 in Oslo, Nor-
way, in the period from 2013 to 2015. This type of
contract had only rarely been used in the country’s
residential sector, and the pilot was the first attempt to
employ EPCs in a comprehensive way in a Norwegian
housing cooperative. In what follows, ‘Definition and
literature review’ provides a definition of EPC through a
review of the literature and discusses some of the ob-
served barriers to using EPC in the housing sector. ‘The
pilot’ presents the proposal and gives a detailed descrip-
tion of the process involving action research in which
the research team initiated, planned and actively partic-
ipated in the process. The methods used will be de-
scribed as we account for the process. In ‘Views
expressed by members of the housing cooperative and
the ESCO’, we examine the perspectives and experi-
ences of the Board and residents of the housing cooper-
ative as well as the ESCO, and in ‘Discussion and
recommendations’, we discuss the results and provide
recommendations.
Definition and literature review
Generally, an energy service contract implies that a
contractor has a long-term responsibility and incentive
to maintain and improve equipment performance of a
given physical structure (Sorrell 2007:508). Energy per-
formance contracting (EPC) is a particular form of ser-
vice contract in that the contractor pledges, through a
binding commitment, that a specified amount of energy
will be saved through the project. This implies that the
contractor’s compensation is directly linked to the per-
formance of the project over time (Larsen et al. 2012:8,
Hoyle 2013:5, see also Bertoldi et al. 2006; Nolden and
Sorrell 2016).
There are two main schemes for EPC, one involving
‘shared savings’, which implies that the performance
1 The role of the European Code of Conduct for EPC is ‘to bring
confidence to the EPC market in Europe and compliance with the
Code of Conduct serves as a minimum guarantee of the quality of
EPC projects implemented.’ http://www.transparense.eu/eu/epc-
code-of-conduct Accessed 31.05.2016.
2 The pilot formed part of the research project ESPARR: Energy
savings from regulation to realisation, led by CICERO, Oslo.
3 The type of housing cooperative we refer to may also be called
‘large housing estates’ (e.g. Brattbakk and Hansen 2004). In
Norway, most of these cooperatives, as the one under study, have
private tenancy with each dwelling household being the owner of
its flat. Each cooperative has a general assembly consisting of all
residents who each have a vote when decisions are made. To reach
a decision on major investments, a majority of at least 75 % is
normally required.
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risk (i.e. uncertainty of future energy use) is split be-
tween contractor and customer. The other, referred to as
‘guaranteed savings’, implies that the contractor as-
sumes the entire performance risk (Bertoldi et al.
2006:1821–2). In funding arrangements for EPC, the
customer assumes debt, the contractor assumes debt, or
the financing is handled through third-party financing
(TPF). The issue of financing is central to the potential
spread of EPC, and is sometimes used by US observers
as an indicator to denote various types of EPCs, but we
agree with Sorrell (2007:510) that the financing model
does not conceptually affect what EPC is about because
there is always a certain degree of shared benefits in-
volved. The choice of financing model should therefore
be treated as a separate matter.
A common principle regarding the economics of an
EPC project is that the investments in energy efficient
technology will be covered by the saved future energy
costs.4 Together with the binding character of the offer
from the ESCO, which includes fixed costs of invest-
ment and a guarantee that the goals for energy savings
will be achieved, this principle of payback of invest-
ments through saved future costs constitutes the major
argument for why end-users would benefit from using
EPC. To the customer, EPC implies risk-free invest-
ments and guaranteed savings in the future. Figure 1
illustrates the financial principle of an EPC process,
where the guaranteed savings over time equal the vol-
ume of investments in energy efficient measures. This
implies that when the contract ends, all investments
have been paid down, and, given that the energy price
remains the same,5 the running energy costs will be
reduced.
Sorrell (2007) observes that EPC arrangements
differ in terms of ‘scope’, i.e. the number of energy
streams and services that are included, and in
‘depth’, i.e. the number of activities required to
provide these streams and services, and that both
these dimensions influence the potential for energy
savings, risks and transaction costs. Nolden and
Sorrell (2016) distinguish between ‘target bidding’
on the one hand, which enhances competition be-
tween ESCOs but increases their costs and may limit
ambitious goals, and ‘partner bidding’ on the other
hand, which can foster innovation and help the
clients to identify potential savings, but limit com-
petition. Moreover, it has been pointed out that
facilitators such as consultants and other intermedi-
aries (e.g. public procurement frameworks) can play
a vital role in helping clients identify EPC projects
prior to going to tender (Bleyl et al. 2013; Nolden
and Sorrell 2016). Observers have noted that EPC
may also be suitable for projects that go beyond
mere energy saving targets and involve comprehen-
sive refurbishment (Bleyl-Androschin and Daniel
2008; Bleyl-Androschin et al. 2009; Milin and
Bullier 2011; Grosser Lagos et al. 2015; Labanca
et al. 2015). In such cases, the level of investment
may exceed the saved energy costs that are possible
to obtain within a project’s lifetime, whereas long-
term energy use may be reduced and other positive
effects may be achieved (e.g. increased comfort,
improved aesthetics, value of property increasing)
and this model has been tried out in the public sector
in Norway.6 We therefore consider the principle of
achieving payback during a project’s lifetime as a
possible, but not a compulsory, trait of EPC.
Main focus on the supply side
In the literature published in English and the Scan-
dinavian languages, many EPC studies have fo-
cused on the regulatory, financial and supply side
of EPCs, such as comparing the number of ESCOs
in various countries and the total volume of con-
tracts (e.g. Vine 2005; Goldman et al. 2005;
Bertoldi et al. 2006, 2014; Marino et al. 2010;
Hansen 2011; Xu et al. 2011; Guerra-Santin and
Itard 2012). Industry and government sources also
focus on the supply side, and they tend to highlight
the win-win nature of such contracts where both
customer and contractor are considered as benefi-
ciaries. Together with her colleagues, Dr Shirley J.
Hansen mapped the occurrence and views of
ESCOs in 49 countries. In a summary produced
4 The payback time is specified in the contract (for example, 6–
10 years).
5 As we account for below, the guarantee in the pilot project was
linked to energy consumption (kWh/kW) and not costs. Hence, the
risk of increasing energy price was similar to conventional energy
saving projects, but with EPC, one keeps control of investments
and future energy savings, which is not the case in conventional
projects.
6 In the Norwegian municipality Skjervøy, a recently signed EPC
contract included a relatively high share of maintenance activities,
whichmeans that paybackwill not be achieved within the project’s
lifetime.
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for a newsletter, she rhetorically pointed to the
economic benefits of EPC for both contractors and
customers, as well as the wider society (Hansen
2011:9)7:
Imagine an industry where 25–50 % return on
investment is common … an industry that can
cost-effectively reduce pollution and bring us
closer to our sustainability goals … an industry
where customers are offered reduced operating
costs and new equipment without front-end capital
expenses … an industry where the project costs
are paid for out of avoided utility costs – guaran-
teed… The appeal is enormous, so it is not sur-
prising that the energy performance contracting
industry and the energy service companies
(ESCOs), which offer all this, have been growing
rapidly.
Other observers working from a sustainability per-
spective have emphasised the necessity to shift towards
performance-based energy systems such as EPC. For
example, in the context of the deregulated European
energy sector, Steinberger et al. (2009:361) argue that
only a performance-based energy economy will favour
environmental and social goals. The turn to performance
is necessary, the authors hold, because the energy mar-
ket is ‘based on profits through energy throughput’ (see
also Eikeland 1998). They make the call for fundamen-
tally changing the economic structure so that most en-
ergy falls under performance arrangements.
Sorrell (2007) provides an economic analysis of EPC
and points out that performance contracts may only be
appropriate for a subset of energy services and users.
The literature has paid limited empirical attention to the
user side of EPC arrangements, so relatively little is
known about end-users’ various needs when it comes
to this type of contract. There are numerous case studies
available which sum up the projects’ technical and
financial characteristics, such as the obtained level of
energy savings,8 and market surveys also address the
demand side (EEFIG 2015). However, though there are
exceptions (Jensen et al. 2013; Rye Petersen 2010;
Backlund and Eidenskog 2013; Aasen et al. 2016), there
are few academic studies on how EPC is perceived and
practised on the user side. Such endeavours seem re-
quired for understanding the demand side of EPC, as
illustrated in the introductory story from France on how
and why performance contracting was initiated. It ap-
pears as if the benefits of EPC to existing or potential
customers are so obvious that there is no need to further
scrutinise their situation.
Known barriers to EPC in the residential sector
TheEPCarrangementhasprimarilybeenused in thepublic
and commercial sectors and not among households (Vine
2005; Hoyle 2013:19, Satchwell et al. 2010; Bertoldi et al.
2014), thoughsomecasestudieshavebeenconducted(fora
review, see Labanca et al. 2015). Observers have noted
7 The study was published as a book, which also treats a range of
barriers to EPC: ESCOs around the world. Lessons learned in 49
countries, by Hansen, Langlois and Bertoldi (eds.), 2009,
Fairmont Press.
8 See, for example, the EPC Help Desk for Sweden (European
Energy Service Initiative) which includes a list of completed EPC
projects among housing cooperatives (in Swedish): http://www.
european-energy-service-initiative.net/se/epc-helpdesk.html
Accessed 11 January 2016.
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Fig. 1 Illustration of an EPC
process (after Gurigard 2013)
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several reasons for the limiteduseofEPCandother typesof
services that include performance criteria such as Energy
Efficiency Services (ESS) in the residential sector. Hoyle
(2013:26) points out that ‘residential consumers lack scale,
both in per-unit consumption and in the number of readily
identifiable homogenous units’ … and they ‘lack the nec-
essary energy intensity to justify investment within the
structureofpresent-dayEPCbusinessmodels’ (ibid.).Sim-
ilarly, Bertoldi et al. (2014:259) note that the decentralised
structure of the residential sector and high transaction costs
of face-to-face interaction hinder the uptake of EPC.Based
on the review of several studies and cases, Labanca et al.
(2015:285) propose 11 factors that may constitute barriers
to usingEPC (andEES in general) in the household sector:
1. High transaction costs, limited energy costs.
2. High fragmentation of market, need to look at each
individual building; hinders standardisation.
3. The landlord/tenant dilemma: landlord does not
have economic motivation to reduce electricity
costs, which are paid by tenants.
4. Legal requirements, multi-apartment buildings: all
tenants must agree before landlord can make in-
vestments in energy efficiency.
5. Decision making. Private flat owners must agree
before decisions can be made about changes in
building shell and technology.
6. Individual needs and behaviours vary and are dif-
ficult to control; meters are sometimes lacking.
7. Lack of information about existing offers and lack
of understanding the EES/EPC concept, financing
and contract.
8. Lack of credibility on EES/EPC providers due to
lack of legal framework for their accreditation.
9. Fear of becoming dependent on the contractor.
10. Economic crisis and related uncertainty.
11. Lack of public subsidies and financing capital.
Regarding the nature of private consumption (point 6
in the list), Hoyle (2013:26) notes that ‘[c]onsumption in
the residential sector is driven by different factors than
in other sectors.’ The commercial and public entities
tend to operate on set schedules with reasonably consis-
tent consumption patterns, which simplify the estima-
tion of potential energy savings. Residences, in contrast,
… may contain a wide variety of energy-
consuming appliances and devices, numerous
types of lighting fixtures, have unknown building
characteristics that may negatively impact the ef-
fectiveness of energy efficiency upgrades… con-
sume energy based on the behaviour of occupants,
and – most importantly – energy consumption
patterns may vary widely from one household to
another and among individual members of the
same household. (Hoyle 2013:18)
In sum, as seen from an ESCO perspective, both
structural/technical factors and the particular nature of
private consumption may limit a residential project’s
feasibility and profitability. Compared to other sectors,
this spurs a considerable level of uncertainty, which
increases the performance risk (and transaction costs)
assumed by ESCOs that become involved in the resi-
dential sector. In ‘Discussion and recommendations’,
we discuss to what extent and how these factors came
into play in the pilot under study.
As solutions to these barriers to EPC in the residential
sector, it has been suggested to focus on information, tech-
nology and motivation to change consumption patterns
(Hoyle2013), introducepolicymeasures that increasepeo-
ple’s trust in EPC and ESCOs (Labanca et al. 2015) and
focus on the role of project facilitators (Bleyl et al. 2013;
Nolden and Sorrell 2016). Moreover, Bleyl-Androschin
et al. (2009:996), focusing on theGermanmarket, propose
that energy savings in the residential sector canmost effec-
tively be reached through projects that include refurbish-
ment: ‘Additional efficiency potentials of typically 20-
50%canonly be tapped, if building technologies, building
envelope (building insulation, improved glazing) and
targeting user behaviour are integrated into energy service
schemes.’ According to Labanca et al. (2015:294), two
types of models for energy efficiency services (including
EPC)may suit the residential sector particularlywell: First,
the community-based model (social housing, multi-
apartment buildings such as the pilot under study) may
ensure an economy of scale and help reduce transaction
costs. Second, the household model may suit energy sup-
pliers whowish to attract loyal customers (ibid.).
A report by the EEFIG (2015:16) sought to identify
drivers of demand for energy efficiency in buildings in
general and arrived at the conclusion that the following
factors are the most important drivers among owner
occupied residences: (i) payment capacity, (ii) transac-
tion costs/simplicity, (iii) behavioural economics/
personal priorities, (iv) fiscal support and (v) tailored
financial product availability, hence, indicating that peo-
ple’s financial capacity and concern for simplicity are
crucial motivational factors for undertaking energy
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efficiency measures. The report ranks ‘awareness of
appropriate timing for energy efficiency measures with-
in the traditional building cycle’ as relatively unimpor-
tant (number 18 of 25 suggested drivers).
Sociological and anthropological research (e.g.Wilhite
et al. 2000; Shove 2004; Aune 2007) has shown that
domesticenergyuse,understoodasculturalpractices, tends
to be socially conditioned and motivated by people’s con-
cerns for comfort and convenience rather than costs and
savings alone. Domestic energy use is also resistant to
change due to the habitual, non-reflexive character of such
practices (Røpke 2009;Wilhite 2008). Thus, in addition to
the 11 barriers to EPC noted above, households are not
necessarily interested in obtaining energy savings, and in
Norway, the interest in energy savings is particularly low
(Winther and de Lesdain Bouly 2013; Westskog and
Winther 2014). If habits are hard to change and attitudes
are insignificant, the question is what would make them
invest inenergyefficientmeasures.Ethnographicstudies in
Norway and Sweden provide some interesting insights: In
many circles, investments that are socially legitimate are
those which are perceived to be ‘useful’ in an economical
sense and thus, profitable (Henning 2000). ‘Being clever’
or ‘smart’ in the sense ofmaking the right decisions consti-
tutes an important Norwegian cultural value (Norgaard
2011). In this light, theEPCmodel isparticularly interesting
for the residential sector, such as in a housing cooperative
because the process involves documentation in advance of
a project’s profitability. Moreover, through the guarantee
providedby theESCO, it involves low financial risk on the
users’ part. In combination, this appears to have the poten-
tial to produce the image of a ‘useful project’ initiated by
‘smart’ protagonists and thereby providing legitimacy for
making investments in energy efficiency (see Aasen et al.
2016 who found this aspect to be important for why
Norwegian municipalities have embraced the EPC
model). On this background, we were motivated to try out
the EPCmodel in a Norwegian housing cooperative.
The pilot
Initiation
When this interdisciplinary9 research was planned in
June 2011, we wished to study a couple of promising
energy-saving measures in Norway and investigate such
initiatives both from a policy and practice perspective.10
We had learned about the increasing use of EPC among
Norwegian municipalities and decided to focus on this
market mechanism. A committee had been established
at Standards Norway at that time to help prepare a
national standard for EPC (which resulted in the stan-
dard NS6430-2014). One of the committee members,
Mr. Eyvind Kvaale who was employed by the Norwe-
gian State Housing Bank at that time, was working
closely with housing cooperatives and expressed a keen
interest in trying out EPC in the residential sector
through a research project. The advantages of EPC for
housing cooperatives are obvious, he told us. Not only is
there a minimal level of risk involved to the user, but
EPC also has the advantage that throughout the process
the customer relates to one single contractor who has all
the knowledge needed to suggest and accomplish suit-
able energy efficiency measures. Kvaale’s confidence in
the idea and the arguments that an EPC process is low
risk, profitable, simple and maintained by a highly
knowledgeable actor (the ESCO) triggered our motiva-
tion to test out whether and how EPC could be used by
housing cooperatives. The existing literature had not
highlighted the customers’ wish for simplicity (but see
EEFIG 2015), and this appeared as a particularly inter-
esting aspect of EPC.11 The pilot thus set out to examine
if and how EPC might contribute to realising energy
savings among housing cooperatives in a simple and
profitable way.
Finding partners
As a next step, the researchers invited a practitioner
(engineer) who had been central in the initiation of
EPC activities in Norway to join the project. This EPC
9 The disciplines included in the research team were political
science, economics, social anthropology and engineering.
10 In addition to EPC, the project focused on policies, regulations
and practices surrounding smart meters and in-home displays.
11 Bertoldi et al. (2006:1827) treated the EPC situation in Ireland
and found three categories of companies in the Irish energy effi-
ciency business. When touching on the possible motivation of
customers for engaging in EPC, the issue of convenience and
simplicity is mentioned: ‘However, the companies that contract
ESCO-type work in Ireland are interested in saving hassle and
time, not in energy efficiency’. This observation may correspond
to the interest of many potential EPC customers. As long as they
save energy by engaging in EPC, their initial motivation (to save
time and hassle) seems just as good as any other kind of motiva-
tion—and vital for understanding how to approach them and
develop contracts that suit their concerns.
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consultant (one of the co-authors) has negotiated almost
all the more than 50 EPCs that have been contracted by
Norwegian municipalities, and is thereby an experi-
enced ‘facilitator’ (Bleyl et al. 2013). He had also been
engaged by the Norwegian Association of Local and
Regional Authorities (Kommunenes Sentralforbund) to
develop standardised EPC templates andmanuals which
were employed in the projects, and he was a member of
the national committee for the new national EPC stan-
dard. The EPC consultant participated in the research
project and also acted as the housing cooperative’s
consultant vis-à-vis the ESCOs throughout the process.
The role of the researcher was to plan and obtain
funding for the pilot project, lead and facilitate the first
part of the EPC process together with the consultant and
document the process, the experiences of the actors
involved and the results.12
Finding a suitable housing cooperative for collabora-
tion was an important step in the process. The EPC
consultant had been in contact with Mr. Stig Hvoslef
in the Akershus County Council Administration who
was working with energy and environmental issues,
including EPC. Hvoslef was interested in using EPC
within his own housing cooperative, Nedre Silkestrå
Borettslag (Fig. 2), where he was a member of the
Board. The Board had already decided that it was time
to maintain the buildings and improve energy efficiency
as well.13 The apartment buildings (146 flats, a kinder-
garten and some common areas) were about 30 years old
and had not been subjected to renovation apart from
minor repairs. The Board felt that the opportunity to
collaborate on a pilot project had come at an expedient
time and made the suggestion to the General Assembly
(the owners of the flats), who supported the idea to join
the pilot project. It was understood that the members of
the housing cooperative alone (not the researcher/
consultant) would decide if they wanted to engage in a
binding contract with an ESCO after the initial phase.
They would also be solely responsible for deciding what
the contract should include.
The partners acknowledged that the outcome of the
pilot was highly uncertain. In particular, we wondered if
any ESCOs would be willing to provide offers to the
housing cooperative. As noted in the literature, it may be
difficult to estimate the development in private con-
sumption, and this uncertainty increases the risk of the
ESCOs providing guarantees on reductions. ESCO rep-
resentatives in the project’s reference group had
expressed similar concerns.
Inviting ESCOs to make offers
In April 2013, the project invited energy contractors in
Norway and energy consultancy firms located in the
Oslo area to a meeting about the EPC pilot. Nine energy
contractors (with or without experience from EPC in the
public sector) were represented, and in total, there were
22 participants,14 including a representative from
Enova15 who also gave a presentation. We explained
the purpose of the pilot and the premises for the com-
petition, including a special arrangement in which the
contractors would need to be prequalified before sub-
mitting their offers. The reason for this unusual step in
an EPC process was that in order to trigger interest from
ESCOs, the project would give compensation of ap-
proximately 3000 Euros (25 000 NOK) to each of the
12 The methods included participation in two General Assemblies
and two Board meetings, individual interviews with all the Board
members, and several meetings, email exchanges and telephone
conversations with individual Board members. The researcher and
the EPC consultant also participated in meetings with ESCOs and
attended an inspection on the premises as part of the EPC process
ahead of the tender. In September 2013, a brief web-based survey
was conducted among residents of the housing cooperative, asking
about indoor climate, heating comfort and ventilation habits. The
survey was answered by 20 of the 144 residents/owners, thus
14 %. Finally, the researcher followed the residents’ exchanges
of viewpoints on Facebook where the housing cooperative has
created a group.
13 Before the pilot was initiated, the Board had developed a plan
for maintenance and repairs.
14 We did not manage to attract building contractors on this
occasion.
15 Enova SF is a public enterprise owned by the Norwegian
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy which allocates funds to energy
efficiency and renewable energy initiatives.
Fig. 2 Nedre Silkestrå Borettslag, Oslo, the housing cooperative
under study. Photo: Kristin Helena Amundsen
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contractors who provided EPC offers.16 We therefore
had to ensure in advance that the contractors providing
offers (and receiving compensation) had relevant
experience.
Four contractors applied for prequalification and all
were approved. In July 2013, the chair of the Board sent
out a formal EPC invitation to the qualified contractors.
This invitation, which followed the principle of target
bidding (Nolden and Sorrell 2016), constituted a crucial
step in the process in that the client defined the tasks at
hand and the competition criteria and provided informa-
tion about the buildings.17 The invitation also contained
templates for the different contracts to be signed in
forthcoming phases of the EPC project. In the pilot,
these were based on the templates developed and used
by municipalities, though they were modified to match
the situation of a housing cooperative. The most impor-
tant modification was a simplified description of pur-
chasing procedures, as these are regulated and rather
rigid for the public sector but not for the private sector.
As the housing cooperative intended to finance the
project themselves,18 the ESCOs were not invited to
offer loans.
What kind of consumption should be included
in the guarantee?
It took careful consideration to decide on what kind of
energy use should be included in the EPC competition.
This choice would determine what would later be in-
cluded in the guarantee for energy savings, and thus,
ideally, it should include a high proportion of the total
energy consumption. At the same time, the included
energy consumption should be relatively simple to mon-
itor and not induce too much risk for the ESCO.
The housing cooperative used district heating for
space heating (radiators) as well as hot water consump-
tion (showers, etc.). This water-carried energy was
jointly metered, and each household paid a monthly
fee based on the size of the dwelling (number of rooms).
District heating was also used in the cooperative’s com-
mon areas such as entrances, two laundry rooms and a
kindergarten. In total, the buildings included 12.500 m2
of heated space. It was decided that the EPC should
include space heating and hot water consumption be-
cause this constituted a large proportion of people’s
energy use and because the administration of the
metering would be simple. Uncertainty remained, how-
ever, about the agreement with the district heating sup-
plier regarding the cost if the housing cooperative were
to terminate this service and switch to other energy
sources for producing heat. As we discuss, this issue
turned out to be a major obstacle to realising EPC in the
way proposed by the ESCOs.
Every apartment had an electric meter, but individual
electricity consumption was excluded from the EPC
project because this was considered to be relatively
unpredictable and difficult to control, thus increasing
the ESCO’s performance risk. Furthermore, accessing
data on private electricity consumption would have
posed a major challenge due to privacy regulations.19
The cooperative had 24 electric meters for common use
(light in entrances and outdoors, garage, kindergarten,
laundry rooms), which were included in the EPC pro-
ject. In sum, due to these practical, contractual and legal
issues, only 68 % of the total consumption was included
in the EPC project (referred to as ‘basis consumption’),
which the ESCOs were invited to reduce. Table 1 pro-
vides an overview of the cooperative’s total annual
energy consumption prior to the pilot and the volume
and types of energy consumption that were excluded
from and included in the competition, respectively. To
ensure that the offers would be comparable, it was
decided that the call for offers should not include refur-
bishment, maintenance or other measures which were
not directly linked to energy consumption. It was un-
derstood that such aspects could instead be considered
in a later phase of the EPC process.
17 Various attachments followed the invitation, such as the coop-
erative’s historical data on energy use (temperature adjusted) as
well as maps, a description of energy systems, the number and
types of flats, the age and condition of the building construction
and other things.
18 Favourable public lending arrangements are available for hous-
ing cooperatives in Norway.
19 In Norway, the consent of a private household is needed before
electricity data can be shared. Other projects in housing coopera-
tives have shown that it may be difficult to obtain consent from all
households. Households that do not give their consent would have
to be excluded from an EPC project, which lasts for several years.
This uncertainty would complicate the process and reduce the
volume included in the guarantee.
16 Maximum of five ESCOs would be prequalified and invited to
provide an offer. When we later asked the three ESCOs who made
it to the final phase of the competition if the compensation had




Having established what types of consumption to in-
clude in the competition, the invitation also stated the
desired payback time (10 years) and further specified the
criteria for competition which concerned all the three
common phases of an EPC project:
Phase 1Analysis and project development
Phase 2Implementation of energy efficiency
measures
Phase 3Guarantee period (monitor and follow-up
energy consumption)
The ESCOs were informed that they would be eval-
uated on the basis of the profitability of their offers,
using the following criteria found in Table 2.
To calculate the present value of the project, the
following dummy values were provided in the call for
offers: 15 years technical-economic life, 5 % interest
rate and energy price 10 Eurocents (85 øre) per kilowatt
hour. Note that the dummy price of energy was only
used to calculate profitability. The ESCO would guar-
antee savings on the amount of purchased energy
(kWh), not energy costs.
To limit the risk of ESCOs and encourage them to
provide binding offers to the housing cooperative, the
following condition for exception handling (over- and
under-performance) was specified: If the realised sav-
ings (kWh) achieve at least 70 % of the identified goal,
the contract will be regarded as fulfilled.20 If the realised
amount of savings is less than 70 %, the ESCO must
financially compensate the housing cooperative. If the
realised energy savings reach more than 110 % of the
identified goal, the ESCO and the cooperative will share
the gain equally. The prospect of benefit sharing is
common in EPC and intended to motivate both parties
to achieve a high level of energy savings.
The initial offer from the ESCO
After a joint inspection of the premises, three
ESCOs submitted their offers, which were treated
confidentially. A round of negotiations with each
company followed, whereupon they revised and
refined their offers. In December 2013, a contract
for phase 1 was signed with the company offering
the most profitable solution (Boligenergi AS). The
proposed changes/investments included shifting
from district to geothermal heating,21 implementing
automatic regulation of the water temperature, in-
troducing individual metering of hot water con-
sumption, controlling and exchanging various light
sources in common areas such as building entrances
and the garage and other measures. The offer also
included a system for monitoring energy consump-
tion which would be undertaken by the ESCO. The
goal for energy savings set by the ESCO was
1.193 GWh per year, which implied a 46 % reduc-
tion in the total amount of purchased energy; i.e. a
reduction from 200 to 111 kWh/m2 (Table 3).
When taking the agreement on under-performance
into account, this meant that the ESCO provided a
financial guarantee that the cooperative would re-
duce the amount of purchased energy by 32 % and
obtain 140 kWh/m2. This level of guaranteed sav-
ings by one third compared to initial energy con-
sumption corresponds to the binding goals for sav-
ings achieved through EPC in the Norwegian pub-
lic sector (Aasen et al. 2016). Table 3 sums up the
details in this ‘initial offer’ as well as subsequent
offers, which we will discuss.
20 Among Norwegian municipalities, where the performance risk
of the ESCO is perceived to be lower, the corresponding level of
required fulfilment is set at 90 %.
21 In their offers to the housing cooperative, all the three ESCOs
included installing geothermal heating (heat pumps extracting heat
from the ground, carried through water).
Table 1 Energy consumption in the housing cooperative prior to
the EPC pilot, showing the volumes and types of consumption that
were excluded from and included in the project





Total annual energy consumption 2.58 100
Consumption excluded from the EPC
(individually measured electricity)
0.83 32
Basis consumption included in the
EPC (energy for space heating, hot




Heat pump out and refurbishment included, then project
reduced and terminated
During a process of repeated meetings and communica-
tion in phase 1, which lasted for one and a half years, the
ESCO representative, the consultant, and the Board
discussed what measures to implement. On one occa-
sion, a spokesperson from the authorities (Enova) par-
ticipated in a Board meeting (ahead of the preparation of
offer 2) to share knowledge about energy savings and
refurbishment, arguing for the benefit of balanced ven-
tilation systems in terms of energy efficiency and indoor
climate.
An important obstacle to realising the plans in the
initial offer was soon observed. The supplier of district
heating (Hafslund Fjernvarme) put strict conditions on
the cooperative’s request to only use district heating for
peak periods and not as their main source of heating.22
As a result, the suggestion to introduce geothermal
heating was abandoned. This was the single most im-
portant energy saving measure included in the initial
offer. Furthermore, the Board now wished to expand
the list of measures by also including refurbishment (e.g.
change windows, upgrade the facade). This initiated a
lengthy negotiation process in which the ESCO provid-
ed several revised offers, and in the present discussion,
we only highlight the most crucial steps. A central
element of discussion was the issue of introducing bal-
anced ventilation, which the ESCO and the consultant
advised, but which several Board members were hesi-
tant about due to the increased costs involved and the
inconveniences caused by installing ventilation.
The ESCO looked further into the ventilation issue,
and in February 2015, the Board decided to present a
revised offer (offer 2) to an Extraordinary General As-
sembly with approximately 100 attendees including the
ESCO, various suppliers of equipment as well as the
researcher who observed the event. The Board asked the
Assembly to vote either for or against offer 2, which
included changing windows and a less comprehensive
solution for ventilation where existing tubes would be
used with distributed heat recovery through passive
ceramic elements in order to keep costs down and avoid
having to make significant changes in the structure of
each flat. Other measures that had initially been sug-
gested were maintained in offer 2, such as introducing
individual metering and automatic regulation of hot
water, energy saving showers and various changes in
lighting in common areas. The resulting effect, thus the
goal for energy savings in offer 2, was now
534.000 kWh, approximately half of the saving volume
initially offered (Table 3).23
During this Assembly which lasted for about
2.5 hours, the residents commented on the proposal
and asked a total of 79 questions about the 18 mea-
sures included in the package. In addition, during the
days leading up to the meeting, some residents shared
their opinions of the housing cooperative’s Facebook
site. In short, many people were critical of the alleged
need for these measures (and their costs), and others
questioned the chosen technical solutions. On
Facebook and during the meeting, the chair of the
Board responded to each question and repeated that
nothing had been decided yet, and his neutral rather
than emotional description of the elements in offer 2
was probably why the discussion never became22 A rumour reached the researchers that the supplier of district
heating was worried that other cooperatives would also want to
end or change their contract of delivery. The pilot project received
attention in the Norwegian press and during a national conference
(Enova) in January 2014 and also produced a brochure in 2014
which had the title: ‘EPC in housing cooperatives: How they
managed in Nedre Silkestrå’ (translated from Norwegian by au-
thor), which was based on the pilot’s experiences up to the signing
of the contract for phase 1.
23 Correspondingly, due to exclusion of heat pump and
inclusion of refurbishment, the financial profitability was
also considerably reduced compared to the Initial offer.
The investment costs in both offers were approximately
the same; 2.9 million Euros excluding VAT, thus ca
20.000 Euros per household.
Table 2 Criteria for the EPC competition, housing cooperative pilot project
Criteria Measurement Weight
Costs (lowest possible) Costs of phase 1 (50 %) 30 %
Costs of energy labelling of the buildings (50 %)
Customer profitability (highest possible) Present value (50 %) 70 %
Expected energy savings, kWh (50 %)
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heated despite the many questions and objections that
were forwarded. Through a written voting procedure,
the Extraordinary General Assembly voted against
the Board’s proposal, and offer 2 was rejected. The
Board and the ESCO successively reduced the ambi-
tions (avoiding new windows, balanced ventilation
and energy efficient showers) which resulted in offer
3,24 which was presented to the General Assembly in
May 2015, when the composition of the Board was
routinely changed. The meeting gave the new Board
a mandate to follow up offer 3 with the contractor
while defining an upper limit for investments. How-
ever, on September 3, 2015, the Board concluded that
due to declining electricity prices, which were ex-
pected to continue, the project’s financial framework
would not be viable. The EPC project was terminated
before any investments in energy efficiency measures
had been made. In this process, the proposed mea-
sures changed from first including heat pumps, which
would have reduced the amount of purchased energy
considerably. This idea was abandoned because the
cooperative felt forced to continue purchasing district
heating from the existing supplier who put strict
conditions on the prospect of only supplying peak
load. In the next step (offer 2), the share of energy
efficiency measures was reduced while major reha-
bilitation tasks were added, which increased the costs
and reduced project profitability. In the last round
(offer 3), the rehabilitation measures were also re-
duced and the ESCO’s guarantee for savings de-
creased to 10 %. Finally, the plans were terminated.
Views expressed by members of the housing
cooperative and the ESCO
We now examine more in depth some of the view-
points expressed by members of the housing coop-
erative and the Board during the course of the pilot
project. As we will show, the residents’ opinions
ranged from a concern with the aesthetics and func-
tionality of the suggested measures to uncertainty
regarding the need for investment in both energy
efficiency and refurbishment. The effects on their
monthly costs and the value of the properties also
became a heated issue. Moreover, some questioned
the position and loyalty of actors involved, which
implied that a lack of trust became a crucial issue.
24 The investment cost in offer 3 was 650,000 Euros excluding
VAT, thus 4.452 Euros per household. Of this amount, it was
expected that authorities would provide about 100,000 Euros as
subsidy. The housing cooperative would cover the rest through
their joint bank savings and a loan.
Table 3 Goals for energy savings and resulting annual consumption offered by the ESCO








Prior to competition Energy consumption 2.58 200 100
Excluded from EPC 0.830 32
Basis consumption 1.750 68 100
Initial offer (heat pump) Goal savings 1.193 46 68
Goal consumption 1.387 111
Guaranteed savings 0.835 32 48
Guaranteed max consumption 1.745 140
Offer 2 (rehab.) Goal savings 0.534 21 30
Goal consumption 2.046 164
Guaranteed savings 0.374 14 21
Guaranteed max consumption 2.206 176
Offer 3 (reduced) Goal savings 0.354 14 20
Goal consumption 2.226 178
Guaranteed savings 0.248 10 14
Guaranteed max consumption 2.332 187
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Decision making: from desire for simplicity to complex
realities
In the initial phase, Board members said they regarded
the EPC procedure as attractive because they could start
the process, get binding offers from ESCOs, get the
analysis done by a committed ESCO and, at a later
stage, decide if they wanted to go on to phase 2, which
implies investments. This step-by-step process also ap-
peared to make it acceptable for residents to let the
Board manage the EPC preparations and the call for
offers up to the time when decisions on investments
were to be made, when residents would be brought back
into the process. Board members also said they were
content that it was a professional, trustworthy ESCO
that suggested the various measures and that the Board
could have an informed dialogue with the ESCO about
costs, savings and other aspects. The guarantee for
savings and the fixed cost of investment were believed
to enhance effective decision making in the General
Assembly. In a conventional process, the housing coop-
erative would first engage a consultancy firm which
would analyse the situation and suggest measures, then
select what measures to implement through internal
discussion and finally, hire a company (or several) to
do the job. The prospect of a simpler procedure for
internal decision making, together with the guarantee
for savings, were important reasons why this type of
contract seemed attractive to the Board.
However, as the project changed from primarily in-
cluding a technological/institutional change in the pro-
duction of hot water (replacing district heating with
geothermal heat pumps) in offer 1 to the emphasis on
refurbishment together with energy saving measures in
offer 2, which would imply making considerable chang-
es in each apartment (changing windows, introducing
balanced ventilation), the decision-making process
turned out to be more complex than anticipated. During
the year it took to develop offer 2, the Board held several
meetings in which the discussions at times became quite
intense. Some of the issues brought up by individual
Board members were later reflected in the discussion
during the Extraordinary Assembly, when it was not
fully clear whether all Board members supported the
proposal or not. Below, we convey people’s responses to
two proposed and interconnected measures in offer 2:
changing windows and installing balanced ventilation.
The Board had asked the ESCO to include new
windows because the existing ones were more than
30 years old and cases of punctures had been observed.
Consequently, the ESCO advised that balanced ventila-
tion would be needed to obtain energy efficiency and a
good indoor climate, and the consultant supported this
argument as the newwindows would bemore concealed
than the old ones, which had valves for regulating fresh
air. To avoid the need for opening windows to obtain
fresh air (energy loss), a solution for balanced ventila-
tion with heat recovery was suggested which would
ensure energy efficiency while minimising the required
changes in each apartment.
At the Extraordinary Assembly, the questions about
the ventilation system concerned aesthetics, user flexi-
bility, indoor climate and the appropriateness of the
technical solution. For example, participants in the
meeting asked if the fans would make a lot of noise,
what they look like and how many there would be in
each apartment. They also wondered if the balanced
ventilation systemwould require the windows to be kept
closed and if they would be able to open them at all, one
participant declaring that ‘I need to sleep with an open
window!’ Others asked about the temperature and
whether individual regulation would be possible. The
residents’ focus on the indoor climate in their private
homes is not surprising, but the emphasis in the meeting
(protests against the new fans) overshadowed a potential
discussion of the existing indoor air quality. In an initial
web-based survey of the residents (though only an-
swered by 20 of the 144 residents), five respondents
had complained about the existing indoor air quality, but
this issue (and thus, a possible need to improve air
quality) did not receive much attention during the meet-
ing compared to the many questions expressing scepti-
cism regarding the proposed system for balanced venti-
lation. This indicates that residents were more con-
cerned with possible drawbacks of the new fans than
the possibility that they might have a positive effect on
indoor climate.
Some residents had investigated the particular type of
fan on the Internet in advance of the meeting, claiming
that it had rarely been in use in Norway, which made its
suitability an open question. There was considerable
technical competence among participants, and some
seriously questioned the functionality and appropriate-
ness of the technical solution. In this way, a lack of
confidence in the choice of solution arose.
Finally, there were complaints about the inconve-
nience residents would experience during the period of
installing the balanced ventilation (and changing the
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windows). The residents’ input to the suggested bal-
anced ventilation system may be summed up in this
way: If it is a hassle to install, ugly and noisy when
performing, if it provides us with less flexibility than
before and we do not even know if it works well, why
should we get it?
Lack of trust in the ESCO
As to the other central component in the proposal,
changing windows, residents did not question the tech-
nology itself, but rather the timing, the selection of
supplier and the cost. ‘My windows are perfectly fine;
there is no need to change them, so why should we incur
those costs now?’ Another meeting participant
commented: ‘I changed my windows five years ago;
howwill that be handled?’ To this, the chair of the Board
said that such differences would be addressed, but the
issue of cost sharing was not detailed during the meet-
ing. To the issue of timing, Board members referred to
the ESCO’s recommendation and ‘standard knowledge’
which says that windows have a typical lifetime of 30–
40 years and that problems with the old windows in the
cooperative had already been observed. Given that the
windows were now about 35 years old, the window
issue would likely become pressing within the next
5 years, Board members argued, and the EPC process
should therefore accommodate this need in the near
future.
Another topic of the window debate was the selection
of supplier: ‘Given that the Board has not received
incoming offers from several window suppliers, how
do we know that the included offer is the best? I think
it looks rather expensive.’ This quote is important be-
cause it concerns the issue of trust and indicates that the
EPCmodel had not been fully accepted by the residents.
Commonly, when an ESCO with the most profitable
offer has been selected in competition with others, the
achievement of the goals is supposed to be ensured
through collaboration between the ESCO and customer,
both of whom have economic incentives for doing so.
Thus, after signing the first contract, the ESCO and the
customer have a mutual interest in energy savings,
which is likely to strengthen the customer’s trust in the
ESCO’s suggested solutions (but see Backlund and
Eidenskog 2013 for a treatment of firms and how the
issue of trust in the ESCO changed over time). In this
case, however, the expansion of the project after
selecting the ESCO (in phase 1) appears to have
contributed to the residents’ scepticism towards the pro-
posed solutions and reduced their confidence in the
ESCO. In the meeting, participants seemed to regard
the ESCO as their foe and not as their alley. As men-
tioned, refurbishment was not included in the initial
phase in which three ESCOs competed on measures that
dealt solely with energy and savings. This target-
bidding process and limitation at the competition stage
was set to ensure that incoming offers would be com-
parable. As the project was expanded to include refur-
bishment, the EPC principle was followed in that the
contracting ESCO took responsibility for negotiating
and bringing in offers from sub-contractors. To the
people questioning whether the price of windows was
in fact the best possible, this was a crucial step, as they
did not trust that the ESCO had secured the best offer.
Instead, they expressed that the investments in refur-
bishment should have been subject to a competition
process controlled by the Board and not the ESCO.
Economy counts—but how?
The residents expressed concern for the project’s eco-
nomic aspects in a particular way. The figures for
projected savings were shown in the documentation that
was handed out,25 but the home owners did not seem
preoccupied with the potential benefit of saving energy
(and costs) over time. Almost none of the questions
raised during the meeting addressed a need for energy
efficiency, which was the rationale for several of the
proposed measures such as introducing balanced venti-
lation. In informal conversations, Board members sup-
ported this impression and said this is a well-off area in
Oslo where people are more concerned with comfort
than keeping energy costs down. This shows an impor-
tant discrepancy in the perceptions of the ESCO (and the
25 In the documents presented to the residents, each of the 18
measures was specified according to their investment cost and
expected/guaranteed energy savings, e.g. new windows and bal-
cony doors: 13 million NOK investment and 105 000 kWh saved
per year. Also, total investments and total savings were shown.
However, the documentation did not provide a summary of in-
vestment in energy measures on the one hand and investment in
other measures on the other. In the example of windows, the
energy savings over 8 years would be 840 000 NOK (assuming
1 NOK/kWh), thus 6.4 % of the investment cost, assuming a
payback time of 8 years. A presentation of the total investments
and savings for all energy-related measures could have better
clarified the economy of the energy-saving measures to the
residents.
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consultant and some of the Board members) and the
residents regarding the project’s overall goal.
However, critics of the proposal emphasised that the
effects of the EPC investment would imply a higher
monthly rent (specified in the proposal) and that these
project costs would far exceed the saved energy costs.
Here, the chair of the Board agreed and explained that
this was because refurbishment/windows are not purely
energy measures and that they constitute a large propor-
tion of the investment. The critique continued with some
arguing that the increased monthly rent would negative-
ly affect the market value of the flats.26 Individuals who
argued this point did not mention that the increased rent
would be a financial burden on them, which could be
linked to a feeling of embarrassment from admitting in
public to a tight budget. But according the Board’s
impression, most people in this housing cooperative do
not have severe financial constraints. Whatever the case,
despite Board members’ suggestions that the new win-
dows might increase the value of the properties, this
view point was overridden by the argument that a rise
in rent would have a negative effect on property value.
This issue was highlighted towards the end of the Ex-
traordinary Assembly before the voting took place, and
the proposal was turned down.
A final point about the way residents spoke of the
EPC offer concerns how they perceived their own con-
sultant and to what extent they trusted his advice. When
offer 2 had been rejected, several Board members said
upon reflection that the consultant had seemed very
motivated to introduce energy-saving measures but less
informed or concerned about their situation as a housing
cooperative.27 They did not doubt his capacity as a
skilled EPC advisor for municipalities, but stressed that
the residential sector is very different than the profes-
sional sphere (cf. Bleyl et al. 2013).
To sum up the experiences of the housing coopera-
tive in this study and their reasons for rejecting the EPC
proposal, they doubted the need for and benefits of the
measurements and thought the costs were too high. In
effect, they also doubted the competence of the ESCO,
the Board and the consultant. After the vote in the
Extraordinary Assembly, several residents nonetheless
expressed their appreciations for the Board’s efforts and
said that the cooperative would benefit from this work in
the future.
The ESCO’s viewpoints and the communication of EPC
The ESCO side admitted that this EPC process had been
challenging. The project had been more resource de-
manding than anticipated due to the many changes
requested by the Board and Extraordinary General As-
sembly, which led to extra hours planning new mea-
sures. The contract for phase 1 did not specify that the
ESCO’s extra resource use would be compensated, and
this was based on experiences with EPC in the munic-
ipal sector where relatively few individuals are involved
in the process of elaborating the details and where the
final decisions are made by politicians who consider the
needs of the public and not private homes. Another
question that the ESCO and consultant put much effort
into was considering what kinds of energy-saving mea-
sures should be included in the guarantee for savings,
and thus, the monitoring period, and which would not.
Moreover, the principals of the EPC model were ex-
plained to residents in the initial phase. However, at the
time when the decision about investments was to be
made, a similar clarification of the model was not pro-
vided. Nor did the residents receive an overall calcula-
tion of which costs and future energy savings belonged
to the EPC part of the project and which were simply
refurbishments and upgrading of the premises. This
made the proposal gradually resemble a conventional
refurbishment project. If the energy-saving measures
and their payback time had been clearly conveyed dur-
ing the General Assembly (e.g. as in Fig. 1), and thus,
separately from refurbishment, it might not have
changed the outcome in terms of rejecting the project,
but it might have clarified for the residents what the EPC
aspect of this pilot in fact implied.
Discussion and recommendations
The experiences from this pilot project in which energy
performance contracting (EPC) was attempted to be
employed in a Norwegian housing cooperative confirm
26 The monthly rent is included in the announcements when
properties are put out on the market for sale.
27 Some Board members said that they felt that the project had
been too ambitious and that the consultant appeared at times to be
representing the ESCO rather than the cooperative. Consequently,
he was not invited to attend the two mentioned General Assem-
blies. All Board members were asked by the researcher in the
aftermath if they had felt pushed to join and proceed with the pilot
by the research project. Everybody said that they had not felt
pushed, but this reaction vis-à-vis the consultant might indicate
some sense of pressure.
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some of the observed challenges to achieving energy
savings in the residential sector in general and the bar-
riers to EPC in particular. First of all, the residents
neither expressed a deep concern for saving energy nor
did they appear motivated to change their own routines.
The ECSO acknowledged the latter aspect when ac-
counting for the proposedmeasures which all concerned
technical/physical changes and not behavioural change:
‘We expect people to continue using energy as they did
before.’ The low expectations for behavioural change
and the strong habitual element of energy consumption
have support in the mentioned social practice literature.
Second, the pilot failed to produce sufficient trust in the
process. Although residents expressed an interest in
rehabilitation (e.g. at the outset of the pilot), this aspect
only became included in the project at a later stage when
progress was jeopardised through people’s lack of trust
in the ESCO, the EPC process and the solutions sug-
gested. Because rehabilitation, comfort and aesthetics
were important to the residents, we concur with one of
the Board members who said when the process had been
terminated: BWe would have been more likely to suc-
ceed had we presented this to the residents as ‘a refur-
bishment project with an EPC component’ rather than
an EPC project^. Comprehensive refurbishment, thus
projects which are broad in scope, is also what may
ensure the highest outcomes in terms of energy savings
(Bleyl-Androschin et al. 2009), as shown in successful
EPC projects in multi-apartment buildings that have
renovated the building structure, improved indoor air
quality and so forth (Milin and Bullier 2011; Grosser
Lagos et al. 2015; Labanca et al. 2015) In hindsight, it is
clear that the pilot’s strict competition criteria which
solely focused on energy savings did not serve the
overall process well. The tender bidding did enhance
competition, but the expectation that this would also
enhance simplicity and allow the ESCO to help develop
and expand the project further was not realised.
Rather, as the pilot developed, it partly lost and partly
concealed its EPC aspects, and instead took the form of
a conventional rehabilitation project, but at this stage
lacking the important competitive element. In contrast,
the gradual expansion of EPC projects has been realised
with success among Norwegian municipalities; thus, the
failed project in the housing cooperative appears to be
linked to the particular culture and decision-making
processes. The central lesson from this is that ahead of
an EPC tender, housing cooperatives need to spend
more time and resources on project design, assisted by
a facilitator who is familiar with EPC and refurbishment
in this kind of organisation and culture (Bleyl et al.
2013, see also Backlund and Eidenskog 2013).
To summarise the experiences and lessons learned in
this pilot, Table 4 provides an overview of the observed
characteristics of the residential sector and potential
barriers to EPC, where points marked with * have been
retrieved directly from Labanca et al. (2015) though also
often mentioned in the general literature (‘Known bar-
riers to EPC in the residential sector’). Text marked in
italics indicates additional barriers/factors discovered in
this pilot study. To indicate how various actors (e.g.
boards of housing cooperatives, ESCOs and authorities)
may contribute to mitigating the barriers, we group them
according to their relevance at various levels: client,
ESCO and framework conditions.
Table 4 also shows that some of the common prob-
lems with using EPC in the residential sector did not
appear as barriers in pilot, such as residential con-
sumers’ lack of scale, energy intensity and readily iden-
tifiable homogeneous units. The incoming, binding of-
fers from three ESCOs in the pilot reflected that they
perceived the project to be commercially interesting and
viable. As one of them said, ‘When we have seen one
flat, we know approximately what to expect in the
others’. Their engagement also indicates that they did
not think the prospect of residents’ shifting and different
consumption patterns increased uncertainty to an unac-
ceptable level so they would not assume the risk of
providing guarantees for savings. Also, because the
studied housing cooperative is located in the Norwegian
capital of Oslo and included 144 flats concentrated in
one area, the issue that EPC may be hindered by a
decentralised structure of the residential sector did not
apply in this case, though it might very well be relevant
in other places.
Based on these experiences, we have the following
three main recommendations:
1. Refurbishment through EPC.
The use of EPC in housing cooperatives is more
likely to succeed when the project includes com-
prehensive refurbishment and not only energy mea-
sures. This is so because householders tend to be
more interested in comfort and aesthetics than en-
ergy savings. Projects that include comprehensive
refurbishment also have the highest outcomes in
terms of energy savings.
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Table 4 Barriers to EPC in the residential sector, the way and extent they came into play in the pilot, and suggestions to how the barriers
may be mitigated
Barriers for EPC, residential sector Experiences from the pilot project
(housing cooperative)
Suggestions for how to mitigate barriers
Client perspective, general
1 Lack of interest in energy savings Was an underlying, major barrier. Shape and promote EPC project as comprehensive
refurbishment project with EPC component. Start
process by examining and discussing the potential
need for refurbishment (and energy savings).
Suited timing: when refurbishment is required.
2 Lack of willingness to change practices
and reduce user flexibility (Henning
2005)
Initial offer: was not a barrier because
proposed changes did not affect/
dictate energy use.
To be taken into account in initial discussion and
project design.
Later stage: became a barrier (protests
against balanced ventilation).
3 Main focus: comfort, convenience and
aesthetics
Became a barrier. Flat owners
contested effects of EPC measures
on comfort: noise from ventilation,
indoor temperature and air quality,
disturbances during installation.
To be taken into account in initial discussion and
project design.
4 Decision making: private flat owners
must agree before decisions can be
made about changes in building shell
and technology*
Became a major barrier. Would
probably have been enhanced if
the owners had been more actively
involved in the initial stage including
thorough mapping of their needs
and those of the building structure.
A general challenge during energy and refurbishment
projects in self-owned, multi-apartment buildings.
5 High transaction costs, limited energy
costs*
Was not a barrier. An attempt was
made to keep the process simple,
and let the selected ESCO suggest
measures to expand the project
(including refurbishment), but this
failed. Higher transaction costs in
the design phase would have been
necessary.
Community model (housing cooperatives) is likely
to bring down transaction costs.*
Sufficient investment (time, efforts, resources) in
project design appears as condition for
successful result.
6 Lack of information about existing offers
and lack of understanding the EPC
concept, financing and contract*
Became a barrier. Initial phase: one
Board member had experiences
with EPC, and Board was
approached by pilot and research
team who explained EPC principle.
As the project progressed (taken
over by the Board), there was less
focus on the EPC aspect of the
project which was not clearly
communicated to the owners at
the time of decision making.
Strengthen the capacity of EPC consultants/
facilitators. This is a role that could be taken by
umbrella organisations that represent housing
cooperatives. In concrete projects: communicate
the EPC principle throughout the project and
show the distribution of costs and benefits on
energy savings and refurbishment, respectively.
7 Lack of trust, fear of becoming dependent
on the ESCO*
Became a major barrier. Before decision
on investments: project failed due
to a lack of trust in the ESCO and
EPC process.
On the basis of a thorough project design, invite
ESCOs to compete on offers for comprehensive
refurbishment and energy savings.
8 Lack of financing capital* Not a barrier as the housing cooperative
had access to favourable loans and
received a modest, standard subsidy
from Enova. Research project
contributed
to covering parts of client’s transaction
costs.
Norway: Enova has introduced a new subsidy
scheme tailored for the design phase of EPC.
Standard criteria apply for support to investment
in energy efficiency.
Client perspective, technical
9 Lack of meters* and lack of
consumption data
Not a barrier. Installation of individual
metering of hot water was included
in EPC offer as an energy saving
Access to historical and future consumption data
is required. Metering can be done on collective
or individual basis. Higher risk of wasting
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Table 4 (continued)
Barriers for EPC, residential sector Experiences from the pilot project
(housing cooperative)
Suggestions for how to mitigate barriers
measure. Individual electricity
consumption not included in EPC.
practices if consumption is not metered and
paid individually.
10 Existing contracts with energy
suppliers
Became a major barrier because
existing supplier of district heating
put strict conditions on the proposed
change from ordinary supply to
peak load supply.
Examine existing contracts and criteria for changing
them. In Norway, housing cooperatives in areas
with district heating are obliged to be connected
but not to purchase district heating.
ESCO perspective
11 Individual needs and behaviours
vary and are difficult to control*
The ESCO did not calculate with
changed behaviour.
Fair to expect that residents will not want to change
their daily routines in significant ways, but
expect that they wish to ensure comfort,
convenience and flexibility.
12 High fragmentation of market, need
to look at each individual
building/flat. Hinders
standardisation*
Competition stage: Flats considered
to being relatively similar, which
enhanced the preparation of offers
on energy savings, but when later
planning for ventilation and windows
i.e. changes in the physical structure
of each flat: individual variation
became a challenge.
Refurbishment in general: need to look at individual
buildings/flats.
13 High transaction costs, limited
energy costs*
Phase 1: high transaction costs (many
revisions of offer, many meetings
with Board, the consultant and
sub-contractors). Extra work was
not compensated, but competition
criteria were less strict than in the
municipal sector and qualified
ESCOs received a minor
compensation when handing in
offers.
Contract for phase 1: specify a limited number of
meetings and hours covered in the contract and
how unexpected need for extra time will be
compensated.
Framework conditions
14 Legal requirements, ban on data
sharing of individual electricity
consumption
This legislation resulted in the need
to exclude individual electricity
consumption from the EPC. A
major share of the cooperative’s
energy consumption was included
in the EPC because electricity was
not used for space and water
heating.
This legislation implies that when electricity is
metered individually, such consumption is
unsuitable for EPC projects unless the metering
is done jointly. When electricity is used for
space and water heating which constitute a
high share of energy consumption (common in
Norway), this legislation reduces the applicability
of EPC. A proposal for a new regulation in
Norway is likely to put a ban on joint metering
of electricity consumption among housing
cooperatives. This is likely to further hinder the
development of EPC in this sector.
15 Lack of facilitators who are familiar
with EPC in the residential sector
Pilot provided a facilitator
(experienced with EPC in the
municipal sector), arranged a process of
prequalification of ESCOs, and
adapted a standardised contract
that has been used among
municipalities. Both the facilitator
and the contracted ESCO did not
have previous experience with EPC
in multi-apartment flats, and this
may have jeopardised residents’
trust.
Offer training to consultants/facilitators in the housing
sector who can support and represent the building
owners vis-à-vis ESCOS during the EPC project’s
life time. Create a system for accreditation of EPC
consultants/facilitators in the residential sector.
Run more case studies and share the experiences
of clients, not solely technical and economic
outcomes.
16 Lack of credibility on EPC
providers due to lack of legal
framework for their
accreditation*
Offer training to ESCOs in the housing sector
including building constructors as well as
energy entrepreneurs (Grim 2005). Promote
EPC through authorities and policy measures*
Create a system for accreditation of
ESCOs in the residential sector
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2. Identify the client’s needs and involve them in an
early phase.
The pilot project did not include an initial and thor-
ough discussion among the residents regarding the po-
tential need for refurbishment and energy savings before
the EPC project was launched. To enhance predictability
and increase the likelihood that ESCOs will be interest-
ed in providing offers, this discussion should be in-
formed by a project design and preferably culminate in
a voting procedure during the General Assembly (e.g.
simple majority) about the intention to embark on an
EPC project either with or without refurbishment (in-
cluding a list of the main refurbishment measures need-
ed). In terms of energy measures, it is up to the ESCOs
to suggest measures as they compete for the offer, but
prior to the EPC project, the housing cooperative can
discuss their ambitions in terms of goals for energy use
per square meter (cf. ‘passive house standard’).
3. Communicate the EPC principle throughout the
process.
To trigger residents’ willingness to invest in energy
savings through EPC, we highlight the importance of
communicating to decision makers throughout the pro-
cess what the EPC principle implies in terms of invest-
ments and energy savings. In the pilot, this was done
initially, but not repeated or shown for the concrete
project during decision making. The specification of
investments that fall ‘in between’ refurbishment and
energy savings (e.g. windows) is challenging but possi-
ble to handle, and the total investments in and guaran-
tees for energy savings should be presented in a clear
manner, preferably through graphic visualisation.
As a final remark, the EPC literature has largely
overlooked the issue of convenience and simplicity
(but see EEFIG 2015), which appear as crucial concerns
to the resident group we worked with as they decided to
get engaged in an EPC project. More studies focused on
the perspectives of the clients are needed to further
understand how EPC could become attractive to them
and fulfil their needs. Currently, a lot of resources are
being spent on meeting requirements to label buildings.
As one of the co-authors has suggested, such initiatives
have similarities with going to the dentist, discovering
cavities and not having your teeth fixed. EPC, in con-
trast, also includes the step of ensuring action. However,
as the presented pilot study indicates, some barriers
persist, of which the most central concerned the issue
of trust and the general challenge of decision-making
processes in housing cooperatives. EPC is not a silver
bullet, but it could be a mechanism that encourages
protagonists to want to see their dentist at all. While
not ignoring potential rebound effects, we think that the
focus on energy technology and physical structure, eco-
nomic viability and guarantees and the monitoring of
consumption over time constitute the major advantages
Table 4 (continued)
Barriers for EPC, residential sector Experiences from the pilot project
(housing cooperative)
Suggestions for how to mitigate barriers
where conditions and culture
differ from public sector.
17 Legal requirements, all tenants
must agree before landlord can
make investments in energy
efficiency*
Not applicable (self-owned).
18 Economic crisis and related
uncertainty*
Not relevant, but expectations for
declining/low energy prices
became a major issue.
19 Lack of public subsidies and
financing capital*
Was not a barrier as the housing
cooperative had access to
favourable loans. Received a
modest, standard subsidy from
Enova.
Norway: Enova has introduced a new subsidy
scheme tailored for the design phase of EPC.
Standard criteria apply with regard to support
for investment in energy efficiency.
Text marked in italics indicates additional barriers/factors discovered in this pilot study
*Retrieved directly from Labanca et al. (2015) though also often mentioned in the general literature (‘Known barriers to EPC in the
residential sector’)
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of the EPC model. We also think this type of contract
has great potential in projects that include installation of
solar PV and other visible forms of energy production,
which may serve to socially legitimise investments in
important ways (Henning 2000). Ultimately, it is people
who decide what measures to initiate or not, and deci-
sion making on energy consumption in household co-
operatives remains a complex field. More knowledge is
needed about how energy savings could be realised
through EPC in this sector.
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